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THE financial and economic turmoil of the years 2007–10 has led to consid-erable regret among financial and economic policymakers about bad policy
decisions at earlier dates. A worthwhile exercise in economic analysis is a care-
ful delineation of the net economic cost of an earlier bad policy decision. Such
an analysis is conceptually difficult because it requires a baseline case against
which to compare observed economic outcomes. Comparing the actual outcome
to that from the ex post best possible policy decisions at every juncture gives
an unrealistically high benchmark, because it compares the actual outcome to
that from policy decisions requiring perfect foresight by policymakers. Also,
rational evaluation requires that all gains and losses subsequent to a policy
decision be included. It is incorrect to evaluate an earlier past decision based
on present and future impacts, since any intermediate impacts between the past
decision date and current evaluation date must also be considered.
This paper suggests a theoretically simple and well-defined procedure for
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SLIDING DOORS COST MEASUREMENT 1257the comparison of actual economic outcomes with those that would have ema-
nated from a counterfactual but real-world feasible alternative decision. We do
this by identifying a specific policy choice available at the time of the decision
which was ‘almost’ chosen. We call this almost-but-not-chosen policy the
sliding doors1 choice. The cumulative economic welfare difference between
relevant economic outcomes under this counterfactual choice and under the
actual choice over all post-decision periods is our measure of the ex post net
economic cost of the actual policy decision. Although we do not follow their
particular methodology, we invoke Leeper and Zha’s (2003) ‘modest policy
intervention’ theory, in which small variations in policy do not alter agents’
rational expectations, thereby circumventing the Lucas (1976) critique of count-
erfactual policy analysis. We argue that this restrictive evaluation procedure
can be illuminating within certain narrow circumstances.
We apply the procedure to the difficult problem of analysing the economic
costs of the excessively lax regulation of the domestic banking industry in
Ireland during the period 2003–08. The view that the lax regulatory approach
of 2003–08 was a policy error is widely accepted; some analysts made this
point contemporaneous with this policy period, for example Honohan (2004),
Kelly (2007) and many others after the subsequent Irish banking crisis, for
example Honohan (2009), Elderfield (2010) and O’Sullivan and Kennedy
(2010). It is also established that this lax financial regulatory approach in Ire-
land contributed fundamentally to the magnitude of the 2008–10 economic
crash in Ireland (see Kelly 2009; Honohan et al. 2010; Regling and Watson
2010). We take it as given that this lax regulatory approach was a mistake and
analyse the economic costs associated with this policy mistake. Our sliding
doors alternative choice is that the strict and prudent financial regulatory
approach adopted by the Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of
Ireland (CBFSAI) in 2009 was adopted six years earlier.
Our modelling method is related to the microsimulation policy analysis
literature, for example Mitton et al. (2000), in which individual household or
business balance sheets are reconstructed under a counterfactual policy change,
and the impact on broader economic outcomes extrapolated. In our application,
we assume that the Irish Central Bank imposed reasonable, prudent controls
on the domestic banking industry during the 2002–07 period. Given this
counterfactual, we simulate the impact of these controls on the aggregate net
balance sheet of the domestic banking sector each quarter and extrapolate the
macro-implications.1 The ‘sliding doors’ phrase comes from the common plot device, in which fictional characters’
experiences are shown in two alternative realities, bifurcating at a single, changed event; the popu-
lar movies Sliding Doors (1998) and It’s a Wonderful Life (1945) are two well-known examples
using this plot device.
 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
1258 G. CONNOR AND B. O’KELLYThere were other contemporaneous policy errors in Ireland, such as in fiscal
policy (Conefrey and Fitzgerald 2010; Regling and Watson 2010) and planning
and regional development policy (Kitchin et al. 2010). We attempt to analyse
in isolation the effects of the lax controls on bank risk-taking, not conflating
these with the effects of other policy errors.
We find that the lax regulation of banks in Ireland was the pivotal domestic
policy error leading to the banking industry collapse of 2008–10 and the deep
Irish recession of 2009–10. A few simple, reasonable but prudent regulatory
constraints on bank risk-taking could have prevented the Irish banking collapse.
Although Ireland would still have suffered along with the rest of the developed
world from the impact of the US-centred 2008–09 Great Recession, Ireland
would not have experienced a domestic banking industry collapse and the sub-
sequent, very deep recession.
From a macroeconomic perspective, on the other hand, somewhat surprisingly,
the ‘costs’ of this policy error in terms of cumulative lost Irish national income
over the period 2003–10 are actually negative, as least in total (as opposed to
per capita) units. The moderated-boom and moderated-bust in national income
which would have come with a more prudent regulatory policy have offsetting
effects. On the one hand, the policy error contributed substantially to the 11.7 per
cent decline in real GDP between 2008 and 2010 (inclusive, with 2010 esti-
mated). On the other hand, the stimulative impact of the foreign capital inflow
associated with this policy error played a big role in generating the 28.8 per cent
increase in real GDP between 2003 and 2007 (inclusive). It is only the post-2010
impact (because of bank bailout costs and future deadweight costs of fiscal read-
justment) that accounts for a negative total effect on cumulative national income
of the policy error.
An additional impact of the too lax banking controls on GDP during the
2003–10 period is in the volatility of the annual real growth rate, which is
5.13 per cent per annum in the actual history, falling to 4.08 per cent under
prudent banking controls. Large social welfare costs of this policy error, includ-
ing the 2009–10 period of high unemployment, business distress, fiscal imbal-
ance and labour force dislocation, are associated with the policy error’s impact
on this second-moment feature of Irish national income growth.
There are many limitations in our exercise, as is always true with counterfactual
policy analysis, but we try to be open and unprejudicial in acknowledging them
and addressing them to the extent possible. The usual critique of counterfactual
policy analysis – that not all endogeneity can be accounted for when altering pol-
icy inputs – is relevant to our analysis and limits the strength of our conclusions.
For example, although per capita income might provide a more appropriate met-
ric, we instead use total national income. We do this because net migration flows
could be endogenously affected by the counterfactual policy change that we simu-
late, and modelling this endogeneity would be very difficult. Using a per capita 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
SLIDING DOORS COST MEASUREMENT 1259metric, and properly accounting for endogenous population flows, might give a
substantially different measure. We also must make heroic assumptions about the
link between credit growth and credit balances and macroeconomic outcomes. We
state clearly the assumptions made and their impact on our conclusions.2. A SIMULATED HISTORY OF THE IRISH BANKING SECTOR UNDER STRICT AND
PRUDENT REGULATORY CONTROL
In the early years of this century, Ireland had one of the most under-regu-
lated financial regulatory systems in the developed world and was described in
the New York Times as ‘the Wild West Frontier of European finance’ (Lavery
and O’Brien, 2005). Our starting date of January 2003 does not correspond to
the beginning of lax banking regulation in Ireland. Rather, it represented the
continuation of the extremely lax regulatory system firmly in place at that time.
After the credit crisis of 2008, and in particular the Lehman Brothers bank-
ruptcy and the freezing of the interbank lending market, the Irish banking sec-
tor collapsed dramatically (see Honohan et al. (2010) for a careful review of
the Irish banking sector collapse and its causes and consequences; we do not
duplicate the discussion in detail here). Our sliding doors alternative is that
strict and prudent regulation of the domestic banking sector was imposed in
January 2003 and maintained throughout the 2003–10 period.
At each date t, we divide the aggregated domestic bank balance sheet assets
into five categories: PD (for property development loans), RM (for domestic
retail mortgages), BOD (for business loans and other domestic assets), MF (for
central bank deposits and other assets placed with monetary financial institu-
tions) and FA (for foreign assets other than property development loans). We
divide the banking sector’s liabilities into five categories: DD (for domestic
deposits), CFB (for covered foreign borrowing, which is that part of foreign
borrowing equal to foreign assets), NFB (net foreign borrowing, equal to total
foreign borrowing minus foreign assets), DIB (domestic institutional borrowing
of the sector) and EQ (shareholders’ equity).
Domestic institutional borrowing (DIB) is a small component of the balance
sheet; as interbank borrowing between domestic banks is netted out, DIB con-
sists of a relatively small amount of borrowing from Irish domestic nonbank
financial institutions (such as insurance companies) that are not included in the
domestic banking sector balance sheet. Net foreign borrowing, on the other
hand, is very large and entirely accounted for by interbank borrowing from for-
eign banks. In fact, interbank borrowing always exceeds net foreign borrowing,
so that interbank borrowing is being used to fund foreign as well as domestic
assets (see Figure 1). Property development assets are mostly for domestic
projects; only a small proportion is for overseas projects (see Figure 2). It is 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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FIGURE 1
Foreign and Domestic Property Development Assets of the Domestic Banking Sector
Source: Central Bank of Ireland.
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FIGURE 2
Interbank Lending and Net Foreign Borrowing
Source: Central Bank of Ireland.
1260 G. CONNOR AND B. O’KELLYnoted that this domestic-only bank balance sheet does not cover the foreign-
regulated subsidiaries of Irish banks such as AIB-GB Ltd.
We use TA for total assets and note that by balance sheet definition:
TA ¼ PD þ RM þ BOD þ MF þ FA ¼ DD þ DIB þ CFB þ NFB þ EQ:
We simulate an alternative balance sheet history for the sector assuming that
strict and prudential regulation by the Central Bank and Financial Service 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
SLIDING DOORS COST MEASUREMENT 1261Authority of Ireland (CBFSAI) led to the following features for Irish domestic
bank balance sheets:
1. domestic bank lending to the property development industry never exceeded
20 per cent of the sector’s aggregate bank’s domestic deposit base;
2. the domestic banking sector’s net foreign borrowing (foreign borrowing
minus foreign assets) never exceeded 10 per cent of its domestic deposit base.
Neither of these conditions is particularly strict. We view them as observable
sectorwide features of a reasonably prudent bank regulation system; we do not
view them as directly imposed criteria mandated on individual banks. We do
not attempt to model in detail how these sensible risk features of the domestic
banking sector arise from reasonable and prudent regulation of all individual
banks within the sector. See Honohan et al. (2010) for a discussion of how
wildly irresponsible violations of risk criteria by rogue banks within the sector
(effectively ignored by the regulator) led to very inappropriate competitive
responses by other institutions (also ignored by the regulator) and an extremely
fragile, mostly insolvent, banking sector at the onset of the global credit crisis.
In our simulation, we impose the conditions in two steps, with condition 1
being imposed first. In step 1, if PD=DD is more than 20 per cent, then we
shrink PD and NFB equally until PD=TA = 20 per cent. It seems appropriate
that the assumed regulatory pressure on the proportion in property development
lending comes out of net foreign borrowing (and in particular, interbank bor-
rowing) on the liability side, because this is the ‘residual’ liability, whereas
other liabilities are less subject to short-term bank control. Second, if after PD
has been adjusted in step 1, NFB=DD is still greater than 10 per cent, then we
shrink NFB until NFB=DD = 10 per cent. In this case, on the asset side, we
shrink the other three domestic asset categories by an equal percentage, so that
their relative percentages remained unchanged. We leave foreign assets unaf-
fected. We define adjustable assets, AA, as the sum of RM, BOD and MF.
We use * to denote simulation values of all variables; variables without *
denote actual values including variables that are unchanged by the simulation
(such as DD). We weaken the dynamic imposition of the two conditions by never
requiring bank asset decreases, but only disallowing bank asset increases. The
notion is that in practise, rather than being forced to liquidate assets in a given
quarter to meet regulatory risk controls, the banking sector is allowed to ‘grow
out’ of any regulatory violations as domestic deposits grow. So, in step 1, if
(PDt=DDt) is greater than 0.20 in a given quarter, then the next quarter we set
PDtþ1 ¼ PDt or 0.20  DDt+1, whichever is larger. In step 2, if (NFBt=DDt) is
more than 0.10 in a given quarter, then for the next quarter we set AAtþ1 ¼ AAt
or the value of AAtþ1that sets ðNFBtþ1=DDtþ1Þ ¼ 0:10, whichever is larger.
Figures 3–6 show actual and simulated assets and liabilities. Figures 7 and 8
compare the risk features of the actual and simulated balance sheets. Table 1 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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FIGURE 3
Actual Domestic Banking Sector Aggregate Balance Sheet, Assets
Source: Central Bank of Ireland.
PD - Property Development - Foreign and Domestic
RM - Residential Mortgages - Domestic
DO - Other Domestic Assets
MF - Monetary Financial Institutions - Domestic
BO - Other Foreign Assets
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FIGURE 4
Simulated Domestic Banking Sector Aggregate Balance Sheet, Assets
Source: Central Bank of Ireland.
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FIGURE 5
Actual Domestic Banking Sector Aggregate Balance Sheet, Liabilities
Source: Central Bank of Ireland.
EQ - Equity
DI - Domestic Institutional Borrowings 
DD - Domestic Deposits
FA - Covered Foreign Liabilities
NFB - Net Foreign Borrowing
€0bn
€100bn
€200bn
€300bn
€400bn
€500bn
€600bn
€700bn
€800bn
€900bn
Ma
r/0
3
Au
g/0
3
Jan
/04
Jun
/04
No
v/0
4
Ap
r/0
5
Se
p/0
5
Jul
/06
Fe
b/0
6
De
c/0
6
Ma
y/0
7
Oc
t/0
7
Ma
r/0
8
Au
g/0
8
Jan
/09
Jun
/09
No
v/0
9
FIGURE 6
Simulated Domestic Banking Sector Aggregate Balance Sheet, Liabilities
Source: Central Bank of Ireland.
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FIGURE 7
Actual and Simulated Paths of Restricted Ratios
Source: Central Bank of Ireland.
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TABLE 1
Key Risk Features of the Irish Domestic Banking Sector in 2008:Q1 under the Actual and
Prudent Regulatory Regimes
Actual With Prudent Bank
Regulation
Property Development Assets €124.7bn €51.4bn
% Total Assets 17.4 8.4
% GDP 69.3 28.5
Net Foreign Borrowing €132.6bn €26.9bn
% Total Assets 18.5 3.8
% GDP 73.6 14.9
Residential Mortgages 2003:Q1 €45.4bn €45.4bn
Residential Mortgages 2008:Q1 €124.4bn €109.6bn
Residential Mortgages p.a. growth rate (%) 22.3 19.3
Property Development p.a. growth rate (%) 42.4 19.3
Source: Eurostat and Central Bank of Ireland.
SLIDING DOORS COST MEASUREMENT 1265examines some stability and risk features of the actual and simulated bank
sector in the first quarter of the data set, 2003:Q1, and five years later in
2008:Q1 when the US-based credit–liquidity crisis was beginning to rattle
global markets. The banking sector in the simulated history is not conserva-
tively run (retail mortgages have grown by 19 per cent per annum over this
five-year period and total assets also by 19 per cent per annum), but it is not
vulnerable to a credit crisis. Oddly enough, if we accept the ceteris paribus
experiment, Ireland would still have been a big net importer of bank credit in
the simulated history, and so, unlike Germany, France and the UK, not at risk
from toxic asset losses on US-based mortgage-related assets. (These toxic
assets never directly infected Irish bank balance sheets; see Connor et al.
2010.) The ingredients for the Irish credit crisis were home grown, based on a
transformation of massive foreign interbank borrowing into excessive, and
eventually loss-making, domestic property development lending. A few simple,
reasonable and prudent constraints by the CBFSAI on bank risk-taking would
have mostly protected Ireland from this crisis.3. THE IMPACT OF PRUDENT BANKING SECTOR CONTROLS ON THE GROWTH
PATH OF NATIONAL INCOME
This section simulates the impact of the alternative, prudent banking sector
controls on gross domestic product from 2003 to 2010. To do this, we use mac-
roeconomic models to infer the effect of the foreign credit flow and the
increased stock of private sector debt on national income. We take the simu-
lated-prudential balance sheet from the last section as fixed; that is, we do not 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
1266 G. CONNOR AND B. O’KELLYallow for a second-order effect of the altered macroeconomic environment
feeding back to the simulated balance sheets.a. A Macroeconomic Model with Regime Shift
Following Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2011), we assume that the global
macroeconomy undergoes a regime shift after 2007, and we use different model
specifications before and after this date. Prior to this date, the net annual flow of
net foreign borrowing is stimulative, whereas on and after this date, the stock of
private sector debt has a contractionary impact (see Eichengreen and Mitchener
2003; Schularick and Taylor 2009 for related analyses). We call the period
2003:Q1–2007:Q4 the boom period and 2008:Q1–2010:Q4 the bust period.b. Property Development Expenditures Financed by Net Foreign Borrowing
as an Exogenous Expenditure Shock in a Keynesian Model
During the boom period, we treat the increase in domestic bank foreign
borrowing supporting domestic expenditures as a stimulative expansion, with
essentially the same effect as a debt-financed increase in government expendi-
tures in a Keynesian model. In the standard Keynesian treatment, an exogenous
increase in government expenditures increases national income by a multiple m
through its stimulative effect on the economy. Let G and GDP denote govern-
ment expenditures and national income, and DG and DGDP the exogenous
shock and endogenous response of G and GDP, respectively. The standard
model in its simplest form is:
DGDP ¼ mDG: ð1Þ
Assume for simplicity that taxes are fixed. Let B denote government borrow-
ing, we have DB = DG, and hence:
DGDP ¼ mDB: ð2Þ
Although the standard model uses government expenditures (or equivalently in
the case of fixed taxes, government borrowing), it is well known that other exoge-
nous sources of spending, and in particular those associated with foreign capital
inflows, can give rise to the same effect. There is a substantial research literature2 Perhaps ‘non-Miller-Modigliani’ might be better nomenclature than ‘non-Ricardian’ in the con-
text of this private-expenditure channel. In the neoclassical finance model, rational economic agents
would respond to foreign borrowing by domestic banks by ‘undoing’ the foreign borrowing on own
account – decreasing their personal expenditures by an equivalent amount and placing the saved
proceeds into foreign lending. Unfortunately, this was not the response of Irish citizens during the
property bubble!
 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
SLIDING DOORS COST MEASUREMENT 1267on this macroeconomic impact of foreign capital inflows (see, e.g., Calvo et al.
1996; Fernandez-Ariaz and Montiel 1996; Cardarelli et al. 2010). The existing lit-
erature mostly focuses on developing countries where the effect has been most
clearly discernible. Ireland, as a developed economy with a sophisticated capital
market, does not seem an obvious candidate for experiencing a destabilising
macroeconomic boom based on foreign capital inflows; yet this is exactly what
befell the Irish economy. Ireland was a small, open economy in a large new single
currency zone during a global credit glut and with very imprudent domestic bank
regulation. These features interacted to cause the domestic Irish property bubble
and subsequent banking crisis, via a destabilising foreign capital inflow interme-
diated by the banking sector (see Kelly 2009 for related analysis).
Let DEPDE denote the exogenous property development expenditures
supported by new foreign borrowing by the banks, denoted by DFB, where by
definition DFB = DEPDE. Analogous to equations (1) and (2), we can describe
the effect on national income as either:
DGDP ¼ mDEPDE; ð3Þ
or equivalently
DGDP ¼ mDNFB: ð4Þ
We use equation (4) because the exogenous increase in net foreign borrow-
ing is observable in our model.
As in a Keynesian model, we assume that in the short run, the macroecon-
omic reaction is non-Ricardian: economic agents respond to the stimulus from
the increased cash expenditures associated with the foreign liability increase,
but do not adjust their consumption=investment plans to account for the
implied change in net national indebtedness.2 The multiplicative coefficient m
is typically called the fiscal multiplier, but in our application, it is better termed
the exogenous expenditure multiplier, because the spending shock comes from
foreign-borrowing-based property development expenditures rather than govern-
ment-debt-based government expenditures.
As in the previous section, we use * to denote simulated values. Let NFBt
denote the stock of net foreign borrowing at the end of year t; we assume that
the associated stimulative foreign-financed expenditure (FFE), is the average
annual increase in net foreign borrowing over the last two years:
FFEt ¼ 1
2
½ðNFBt  NFBt1Þ þ ðNFBt1  NFBt2Þ ¼ 1
2
ðNFBt  NFBt2Þ: ð5Þ
We use the two-year average increase because Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
(2010, figure 2) find that it takes eight quarters for the full stimulative effect of 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
1268 G. CONNOR AND B. O’KELLYexogenous expenditures (in their case, government expenditures) to impact
GDP during business expansions.
We assume that during the boom period, simulated GDP is the same as
actual GDP except for the differential effect on foreign-borrowing-financed
expenditures of lower net foreign borrowing. Describing GDP in the actual and
simulated histories:
GDPt ¼ At þ mFFEt: ð6Þ
GDPt ¼ At þ mFFEt ; ð7Þ
where At denotes all GDP variation not related to net-foreign-borrowing-
financed expenditures. Taking the difference between equations (7) and (6), At
cancels out giving GDPt in terms of actual GDPt and the observable difference
between the net-foreign-borrowing-financed expenditures in the two histories:
GDPt ¼ GDPt  mðFFEt  FFEt Þ: ð8Þ
The value of the expenditure multiplier m in equation (8) is crucial to our
analysis. There is considerable uncertainty in the literature about its value and
how its value varies with circumstances (see Freedman et al., 2009). Barro and
Redlick (2011) use annual data on military expenditures by the US government
to estimate the fiscal multiplier, getting an estimate of 0.6 to 0.7, but argue that
the multiplier for nonmilitary expenditures is likely to be somewhat lower.
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010), using a structural vector autoregression on
US data, estimate that the fiscal multiplier is 2.48 during recessions and 0.57 dur-
ing expansions (we are applying the analysis during an expansionary period for
the Irish economy). An open economy like Ireland may have a lower expenditure
multiplier than a relatively closed one like the US. We use m = 0.5 as our base-
case estimate, but also consider other values and re-run the analysis accordingly.
The expenditure stimulus associated with the net foreign borrowing is very
large. Figure 9 shows the annual increase in net foreign borrowing each year,
and Figure 10 converts this into percentage GDP stimulus using equations
(5)–(7) with the baseline value of m = 0.5.c. The Credit Crisis Regime
After 2007, the Irish economic regime changes. After this date, a Ricardian-
type correction occurs. Economic agents become aware of the dangerous over-
hang of private indebtedness and adjust their behaviour, leading to an economic
contraction. In the 2008–10 bust regime, we rely on the estimates of Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2011) who find that in developed markets, the increase in the 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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SLIDING DOORS COST MEASUREMENT 1269stock of private credit to GDP ratio between 2004 and 2007 is linked to the
decrease in real GDP growth in each of the two crisis years 2008 and 2009.
We measure private sector credit (PSC) as the sum of property development,
residential mortgages and business and other domestic assets:
PSCt ¼ PDt þ RMt þ BODt;
and the same for PSCt using the simulated values. The private sector credit
ratio (PSCR) is just PSC divided by GDP, PSCRt = PSCt=GDPt, and the same
for the simulated value, using PSCt and GDP

t in place of PSCt and GDPt.
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2011) use panel data regression across a range of
countries to estimate the impact of PSCR and other country-specific variables on
the magnitude of the negative growth shock in each country in the crisis years
2008 and 2009 (inclusive). Their linear model of real GDP growth takes the form: 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
1270 G. CONNOR AND B. O’KELLYgt ¼ Bt þ hðPSCR2007:Q4  PSCR2003:Q4Þ; ð9Þ
with h = 0.0733 from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2011, table 6, column 4) and
Bt denoting all explanatory variables not differing between the sliding doors
simulation and actual history. It is noted that equation (9) applies to real rather
than nominal GDP growth rates. Let it denote observable inflation in period t
gives gt ¼ ðGDPt=GDPtÞ=ð1þ itÞ  1 and gt ¼ ðGDPt =GDPt Þ=ð1þ itÞ  1
where we assume inflation is unaffected by the simulation. We use the Eurostat
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices for Ireland as the source of the annual
inflation rate. Applying equation (9) to both the actual and simulated econo-
mies and rearranging gives:
GDPt ¼ ð1þ itÞf1þ gt þ h½ðPSCR2007:Q4  PSCR2004:Q4Þ
 ðPSCR2007:Q4  PSCR2004:Q4ÞgGDPt1: ð10Þ
The PSCR calculated from the actual data is 1.36 in 2004:Q4 and 2.06 in
2007:Q4; for the simulated economy, it is 1.19 and 1.62, respectively.
We make one adjustment to the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2011) estimates,
allowing the linear effect of the private sector credit ratio on GDP growth to
extend to the year 2010 in the Irish case; the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti estimation
sample ends in 2009. It seems clear that the enormous overhang of excessive
private sector credit continued to impact Irish growth in 2010, although this
might not be true for other developed markets that recovered more quickly.
Table 2 shows actual and simulated nominal and real GDP based on the model
described above. Figure 11 illustrates the paths of actual and simulated real GDP
for the base case of m = 0.5. Also shown is the Honohan et al. (2010) simulation
of real GDP without the Irish-specific 2008–10 bust. The Honohan simulation
assumes that, in the absence of the Irish domestic banking crisis, Irish real GDP
growth would have matched the Eurozone average during this period. It is noted
that the Honohan simulation makes no adjustment during the earlier boom period
and instead uses the actual GDP values there. Honohan et al.’s ‘Ireland without
bust’ simulation has ‘no-bust’ Irish GDP 10 per cent higher than actual GDP in
2010. However, this only adjusts for one side of the boom-bust cycle. In our sim-
ulation, with both the credit-induced boom and credit-induced bust included, real
GDP in 2010 is only 1.3 per cent higher under the prudent regime. Furthermore,
this difference does not take account of the much higher levels of real GDP in the
years 2003–07 in the boom period under lax financial regulation.
It is worth reiterating that our point estimates are imprecise, and we do not
claim to show that the bank-related net foreign borrowing inflow explains all3 Using 2 per cent to compound=discount cash flows across years.
 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
TABLE 2
Nominal and Real GDP under Actual and Simulated Histories (billions of Euros)
Year Nominal
GDP
(Actual)
Nominal GDP
(With Prudent
Regulation)
Real GDP
(Actual, 2002
Price Basis)
Real GDP
(With Prudent
Regulation)
2003 140.0 138.5 136.3 134.8
2004 149.3 142.0 142.5 135.5
2005 162.3 151.9 151.1 141.4
2006 177.3 168.2 159.1 150.9
2007 189.4 180.0 168.1 159.8
2008 180.0 174.7 162.1 157.3
2009 159.6 158.4 149.8 148.7
2010 153.9 155.9 149.7 151.6
Source: Eurostat and Central Bank of Ireland.
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Aggregate Real GDP under Actual and Simulated Histories, Relative to their Values in 2002
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SLIDING DOORS COST MEASUREMENT 1271of the boom-bust cycle. Other policy errors (in fiscal policy, tax policy and
land-use policy) likely played a significant role in exacerbating the cycle.4. MEASURING THE ECONOMIC LOSSES BECAUSE OF THE LAX REGIME
a. Impact on Cumulative GDP
As shown in Figure 11, lax bank regulation and the associated foreign capi-
tal inflow first increased and then sharply decreased, Irish GDP. The investment 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
TABLE 3
Alternative Estimates of the Fiscal Multiplier and the Implied Net Cumulative National Income
Impact (millions of Euros)
Fiscal
Multiplier
Cumulative
GDP Cost of
Lax Regulation
Bank Bailout
Cost
Deadweight
Costs of
Adjustment
(lost future
GDP)
Implied
Cumulative
GDP Cost of
Lax Regulation
0.75 80,443 70,000 7,500 2,943
0.5 46,053 70,000 7,500 31,447
0.25 11,663 70,000 7,500 65,837
0.1 8,971 70,000 7,500 86,471
– – – – –
0.75 80,443 70,000 30,000 19,557
0.5 46,053 70,000 30,000 53,947
0.25 11,663 70,000 30,000 88,337
0.1 8,971 70,000 30,000 108,971
Source: Eurostat and Central Bank of Ireland.
1272 G. CONNOR AND B. O’KELLYof this capital inflow into negative-return property development assets also left
a large overhang of domestic bank losses, which have been substantially ‘socia-
lised’ by the Irish government’s bank bailout policies. Using a risk-neutral
present discounted value metric with a risk-free nominal rate of 2 per cent, and
comparing the conditional realised GDP paths for the simulated and actual his-
tories, gives a cumulative GDP measure of the cost of the lax regulatory policy
(assuming risk neutrality towards income volatility). For the actual GDP his-
tory, we also add in the (approximately) €70 billion cost of the bank bailout,
which is not yet paid as of 2010 but which will come out of future income as
an uncompensated expense. We also include a €7.5 billion deadweight cost,
reflecting the future income costs of fiscal and economic re-adjustment that
must take place because of the boom-bust cycle.
Table 3 shows the cumulative GDP costs for a range of values of the fiscal
multiplier m, because there is considerable uncertainty about the correct value
to use in this context. All the costs are stated in nominal 2010 euros, for conve-
nience.3 In the base case, with m = 0.5, the net economic cost in terms of lost
GDP is €31.4 billion. A higher value for the multiplier, m = 0.73, solves
the numerical problem of giving total GDP cost of exactly zero. In this case,
the GDP gains from lax regulation in the boom are equal to the losses during
the bust, plus the bank bailout and deadweight costs. For the GDP gains and4 We treat the €70 billion government expenditure on bank bailouts as entirely ‘wasted’ expendi-
ture with no utility value to Irish taxpayers. It replaces ‘useful’ government expenditures or
increases taxes, or a combination. The €7.5 billion reflects growth-diminishing shocks associated
with the bank crisis, including decreased future income growth associated with higher taxes to pay
for the bank bailout.
 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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SLIDING DOORS COST MEASUREMENT 1273losses to be equal on their own, without taking account of bank bailout and
deadweight costs, the expenditure multiplier must equal 0.17 (see Table 3). If
the reader feels that the deadweight costs of €7.5 billion are an underestimate,
it is simple to adjust the costs by adding any additional amount, in 2010 nomi-
nal euros, to the total costs shown in the last column. We also show an alterna-
tive case with deadweight costs of €30 billion in the table.
The aforementioned analysis relies on total rather than per capita GDP.
Figure 12 compares the growth rates of total and per capita Irish GDP over the
period. As there was substantial population growth during this period, the
per-capita growth in GDP is more muted during the boom. There is not an
offsetting decline in population during the 2008–10 bust. In per capita terms,
the outcome for the Irish economy over the full period is poor. Real per capita
GDP is essentially the same in 2010 as in 2002, with a cumulative eight-year
growth rate of minus 0.31 per cent. Figure 12 takes no account of the estimated
€77.5 billion bank bailout, and readjustment costs, which although not an
immediate drain on income, are a substantial downward shock to per capita
wealth.4
What would have happened to Irish per capita GDP with prudent bank regu-
lation? To extend our sliding doors cost measurement to consider per capita
GDP, it would be necessary to specify how the sliding doors alternative
impacts migration flows. This is empirically problematic. Extensive net immi-
gration into Ireland during the period was an important enabling feature of the5 Volatility is measured by the time-series standard deviation of annual real GDP growth rates; see
Table 2.
 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
1274 G. CONNOR AND B. O’KELLYIrish boom. Growth in the Irish-resident labour force kept wage rates down and
ameliorated problems with labour scarcity. In essence, the large level of net
immigration during this boom period served to match the foreign capital inflow
with a parallel labour inflow. Hence, the migration inflows are related to the
capital inflows, and the capital inflows differ in our sliding doors simulation.
Specifying and quantifying the functional link between capital inflows and
migration goes beyond the empirically feasible range of the model. Rather than
produce untrustworthy per capita GDP simulations, we only attempt to measure
the total GDP impact of the sliding doors alternative.b. GDP Volatility and Other Economic Costs
The simple calculation in the previous subsection only measures the sliding
doors cost in terms of the aggregated path of GDP. There was also a large
increase in the variability of growth attributable to the policy error. For
2003–10 (inclusive), the volatility5 of actual per annum real GDP growth rate
was 5.13 per cent; under the base-case prudent regime, this falls substantially
to 4.08 per cent. At a deeper level, the social costs associated with the boom-
bust cycle (gyrating unemployment, business distress and labour force disloca-
tion) are tied to this heightened volatility rather than to the aggregate level of
GDP over the period.
The boom-bust cycle and its dependence on tax-revenue-rich property devel-
opment also engendered an extremely dangerous fiscal imbalance (see, e.g.
Regling and Watson, 2010). Cardarelli et al. (2010) conduct an extensive empiri-
cal survey of episodes of large capital inflows and their macroeconomic impact.
They find that such inflows commonly leave damaging fiscal imbalances in their
aftermath, particularly if the national fiscal authorities do not offset the expan-
sionary impact or become reliant on capital-inflow-related taxes. In the Irish case,
not all of the painful and dangerous fiscal imbalance consequent to the bank crisis
can be directly ascribed to lax bank regulation; it also reflects serious errors in fis-
cal management during the period. It is arguable that if bank regulation had been
more prudent, the Irish fiscal authorities would have found other methods to over-
stimulate the economy during the period, replacing the capital-inflow-caused
boom-bust cycle with a tax-and-expenditure-caused boom bust. There is no way
to entirely separate the fiscal policy errors from the lax regulation policy errors;
this reflects the limits to knowledge using counterfactual-based policy analysis.5. SUMMARY
This paper describes a restrictive approach to the analysis of policy errors,
an approach that we call sliding doors cost measurement. The procedure relies 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
SLIDING DOORS COST MEASUREMENT 1275on identifying a specific past policy error and counterfactually replacing it with
a feasible alternative policy that was available at the time of the flawed deci-
sion. Then, the ramifications of the alternative policy decision, what we call
the ‘sliding doors alternative’, are examined and analysed, by simulating the
impact of this alternative decision on economic outcomes and comparing them
to the actual outcomes that arose from the flawed decision. This restrictive pro-
cedure is difficult to implement and empirically challenging but can be illumi-
nating in some circumstances. We apply the procedure to the lax regulation of
the Irish financial services sector during 2003–07 and get useful results.
First, we demonstrate that the extremely lax controls on the Irish domestic
banking sector were the pivotal domestic policy error leading to the 2008–10
Irish banking crisis. If Irish bank regulators had acted reasonably prudently
over the 2003–07 period, then Irish domestic markets would have been shaken
but not stirred by the US-centred credit–liquidity crisis of 2008–09.
Second, the macroeconomic effects of the excessively lax Irish bank regula-
tory policy were to increase the volatility of national income growth and to
reallocate income growth to the earlier ‘boom’ years of the period while
removing it from the later ‘bust’ years. The boom-bust growth pattern engen-
dered by this disastrous policy error had enormous social cost in terms of
gyrating unemployment, dangerous fiscal imbalance, business distress and
labour force dislocation. The impact on cumulative national income, however,
is dampened considerably when both the initial income ‘boom’ and subsequent
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